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Decisions researchers generally agree that the 
method of elicitation – be it task format or 
response mode – has a huge impact on peo-
ple’s responses: different task formats, such 
as probabilities and frequencies (Gigerenzer 
and Hoffrage, 1995) – or decisions from 
description and experience (Hertwig et al., 
2004), trigger drastically different behavior. 
Different response modes, such as choosing, 
pricing, and matching, have been shown to 
prompt substantial discrepancies in people’s 
preferences (e.g., Lichtenstein and Slovic, 
1971; Tversky et al., 1988). While these 
streams of research have received much atten-
tion, much less is known about the effects 
of task format in decisions from descrip-
tion, which have been the staple for decision 
researchers. Here the underlying assump-
tion seems to be that task format has little or 
no effect on the choice process (Birnbaum, 
2004; Birnbaum et al., 2008). When choices 
differ across experiments, such instabilities 
can always be modeled by (a) using flex-
ible multi-parameter models that allow for 
the description of strikingly different choice 
data (see Brandstätter et al., 2008 for a dis-
cussion), or by (b) situating an editing phase 
prior to the selection phase (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979). In both attempts the core 
process – the weighting and summing of 
information – remains unaffected. I argue 
that both attempts seem unsatisfactory, since 
different task formats trigger fundamentally 
different choice processes in decisions from 
description. Instead of advocating single cal-
culus models I propose an adaptive tool box 
view of risky choice (Gigerenzer et al., 1999; 
Brandstätter et al., 2008). The crucial ques-
tion thus becomes: which task format triggers 
which choice process? To answer this question 
I concentrate on decisions from descriptions 
and on two fundamentally different accounts 
of risky choice: expected utility theory and 
its modifications, and the priority heuristic 
(Brandstätter et al., 2006).
Expected utility theory and its modifica-
tions are historically rooted in the work of 
Daniel Bernoulli, and these models rest on 
the assumption of weighting and summing 
of information. Examples are expected util-
ity theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 
1947), cumulative prospect theory (Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1992), and the transfer 
of attention exchange model (Birnbaum 
et al., 2008). Interpreted as process theo-
ries, expected utility theory, for example, 
predicts that people value payoffs with a 
utility function, multiply the utilities by the 
probabilities, sum the products, and finally 
select the gamble with the higher sum of 
weighted values. These theories, therefore, 
predict that people process information 
within each gamble, such that an overall 
evaluation for each gamble is made.
The priority heuristic, which represents a 
different class of models, builds on the work 
of Luce (1956), Simon (1957), Tversky (1969), 
and Selten (2001). It is a simple lexicographic 
semiorder strategy that implies several classic 
violations of expected utility theory that had 
previously been accounted for by modifica-
tions of expected utility theory (Brandstätter 
et al., 2006; Katsikopoulos and Gigerenzer, 
2008). Across four different data sets with a 
total of 260 problems, the priority heuristic 
predicted the majority choice better than each 
of three modifications of expected utility did. 
A process test using reaction times further 
confirmed the heuristic’s process predictions 
(Brandstätter et al., 2006).
To illustrate the heuristic, consider a 
choice between two simple gambles where 
each offers “a probability p of winning 
amount x and a probability (1−p) of win-
ning amount y.” A choice between two such 
gambles contains four reasons for choosing: 
the maximum gain, the minimum gain, and 
their respective probabilities; because prob-
abilities are complementary, three reasons 
remain: the minimum gain, the probability 
of the minimum gain, and the maximum 
gain. For choices between gambles having 
two non-negative outcomes (all outcomes 
are zero or positive), the heuristic consists 
of the following steps:
Priority rule. Go through reasons in the 
order of minimum gain, probability of 
minimum gain, maximum gain.
Stopping rule. Stop examination if the 
minimum gains differ by 1/10 (or more) 
of the maximum gain; otherwise, stop 
examination if probabilities differ by 1/10 
(or more) of the probability scale.
Decision rule. Choose the gamble with 
the more attractive gain (probability).
One-tenth of the maximum gain repre-
sents the aspiration level for gains, and 0.1 
that for probabilities1. Note, the aspiration 
level for gains is not fixed but changes with 
the maximum gain of the problem. For 
probabilities, which are bound between 0 
and 1, the aspiration level of 0.1 is fixed. The 
term “attractive” refers to the gamble with 
the higher (minimum or maximum) gain 
and to the lower probability of the minimum 
gain. The heuristic does not use any non-
linear transformations of outcomes and 
probabilities but takes both in their natural 
currencies (i.e., objective cash amounts and 
objective probabilities). Unlike the expec-
tation-type models, the priority heuristic 
predicts that people process information 
between rather than within gambles. For 
gambles involving losses, the term “gain” is 
replaced by “loss.” For gambles with more 
than two outcomes, and gambles involving 
gains and losses (“mixed gambles”), see 
Brandstätter et al. (2006).
To illustrate the conceptual difference 
between an expectation-type model such as 
prospect theory and the priority heuristic 
(for details see Brandstätter and Gußmack, 
submitted), consider the following choice 
problem (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
A: 6,000 with p = 0.001
  0 with p = 0.999
B: 3,000 with p = 0.002
  0 with p = 0.998
Most people (73%) chose Gamble A. 
How does prospect theory explain this 
majority choice? The standard value func-
tion is concave for gains, which implies 
1For the sake of simplicity, I disregard the idea that 
aspiration levels are rounded (for details see Brand-
stätter et al., 2006).
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between €6,000 with probability 0.001 and 
€3,000 with 0.002. Taken together,(a) sep-
arated gambles in combination with tools 
that merely measure information search 
show that people search information within 
gambles, whereas (b) neutral task formats in 
combination with tools that measure deeper 
cognitive processing suggest that cognitive 
operations akin to those of the priority heu-
ristic best explain violations of expected util-
ity theory.
Salience effectS
Salience, I propose, has a strong effect on 
choice processes. To estimate parameter val-
ues for cumulative prospect theory, Tversky 
and Kahneman (1992) used certainty 
equivalents inferred from choices. Certainty 
equivalents represent the amount of money 
at which a person is indifferent between 
taking a risky gamble or a sure amount. In 
their experiments participants made many 
similar choices between one uncertain 
prospect and many sure amounts. Hence, 
the sure amount varied, whereas the prob-
ability of the uncertain prospect remained 
constant (for a similar procedure see, e.g., 
Tversky and Fox, 1995; Kilka and Weber, 
2001; Abdellaou et al., 2005). This method 
focuses attention on the varying element 
(i.e., outcomes), while the constant ele-
ment (i.e., probability) is largely ignored. 
Why not put things the other way around? 
What would happen if participants always 
chose between the same sure amount and 
a gamble containing varying probability 
information? Prospect theory’s qualitative 
features might be quite different.
To test this conjecture one study manipu-
lated probability salience (Brandstätter and 
Kühberger, submitted). To this end, par-
ticipants estimated the probability of an 
uncertain event; then they chose between 
a risky gamble containing the estimated 
probability (i.e., you win €50 if the uncer-
tain event occurs, otherwise nothing) and a 
sure amount of equal expected value. Results 
differed markedly between the control con-
dition, which contained the same problems 
in text format, and the probability salience 
condition. Supporting previous research, in 
the control condition, participants were risk-
seeking for low probabilities and risk-averse 
for high ones. In the probability salience 
condition, the opposite pattern emerged, 
and participants were risk-averse for low 
probabilities and risk-seeking for high ones. 
 heuristic might not capture the choice pro-
cess (Glöckner and Betsch, 2008; Johnson 
et al., 2008; Glöckner and Herbold, 2011). 
Previous tests using eye-tracking or com-
puterized process tracing techniques, such 
as Mouselab, usually employed neutral 
information display matrices in which 
columns represented alternatives, and 
rows attributes (Ford et al., 1989). Such 
matrices are neutral, because they favor 
neither search between nor within alter-
natives (gambles) or attributes (reasons). 
The above studies, in contrast, investi-
gated information search by using gam-
bles that were sharply separated: gambles 
were either placed in extra boxes (Glöckner 
and Betsch, 2008; Glöckner and Herbold, 
2011) or separated by a line (Johnson 
et al., 2008). Unsurprisingly, such task for-
mats foster search within but not between 
gambles – thereby favoring expected utility 
theory and its modifications. Information 
search measured through eye-tracking or 
Mouselab, further, may not be equated with 
information processing measured through 
think-aloud protocols (Ericsson and Simon, 
1993).
To overcome this limitation, we used 
classic think-aloud protocols to measure the 
cognitive processes underlying violations of 
expected utility theory (Brandstätter and 
Gußmack, submitted). To ensure neutral-
ity in task format, we employed the same 
format as in Kahneman and Tversky (1979):
Alternative A Alternative B
 0.1% chance to  0.2% chance to  
  win €6,000   win €3,000
 99.9% chance to  99.8% chance to  
  win nothing   win nothing
What would you choose?
 A ¡ B ¡
It should be noted that this format was 
intended to support prospect theory – not 
the priority heuristic. Results show that 
across all 14 one-stage problems taken 
from Kahneman and Tversky (1979), most 
of the protocols revealed that people pro-
cess information between rather than within 
gambles – thus lending strong support to 
processes implied by the priority heuristic 
(Brandstätter and Gußmack, submitted). 
That is, it is the difference between 6,000 and 
3,000 rather than the overweighting of small 
probabilities that determines the choice 
that the larger amount of 6,000 is devalued 
more than the smaller amount of 3,000 
(i.e., compared to a linear value function). 
The standard value function, thus, predicts 
B but not A. Prospect theory must explain 
the choice of A by the overweighting of small 
probabilities. That is, the overweighting of 
0.001 (compared to 0.002) must be stronger 
than the devaluation of 6,000 (compared 
to 3,000). Because the weighting function 
is not well-behaved near the endpoints 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), consider 
the other possibilities of (a) underweight-
ing, (b) linear weighting, and (c) ignor-
ing small probabilities. Underweighting of 
small probabilities (captured by an S-shaped 
rather than an inverse S-shaped probability 
weighting function) implies the choice of 
B but not of A – as does a linear weight-
ing function (due to the value function). 
Ignoring small probability outcomes pre-
dicts guessing, because the zero outcomes 
remain. None of these additional possibili-
ties, therefore, can account for the choice of 
A. The same reasoning holds for cumulative 
prospect theory, since both prospect theo-
ries are identical for two-outcome gambles. 
According to (cumulative) prospect theory, 
only the minute difference between 0.001 
and 0.002 can cause the choice of A.
For the priority heuristic, this difference 
is neglected. The heuristic first compares 
the minimum gains (0 and 0). Because they 
do not differ, the probabilities (0.999 and 
0.998 or their logical complements 0.001 
and 0.002) are compared. This difference 
falls short of the aspiration level (i.e., 
smaller than 0.1) and people are predicted 
to choose A, because of its higher maximum 
gain. Thus, the priority heuristic captures 
the majority choice by using comparisons 
between rather than within gambles.
Both the priority heuristic and prospect 
theory can model the majority choice. In the 
following I will investigate which of these 
two models better captures the majority 
choice. We will see that task format plays 
a key role in this endeavor. In the light of 
both models, I also investigate the effect of 
salience on people’s choice processes.
Different formatS–Different 
ProceSSeS
format effectS in ProceSS tracing
Soon after the publication of the priority 
heuristic, studies investigating informa-
tion search suggested that the priority 
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If winning was unlikely,  participants thought 
that they would not win anyway and selected 
the sure amount over the gamble; if winning 
was likely, they chose the risky gamble. These 
findings suggest a reference point of p = 0.5 
(i.e., winning is likely/unlikely) rather than 
reference points of p = 0 and p = 1. The fact 
that findings differ substantially for different 
task formats highlights the error in hoping to 
uncover (a) a general choice pattern under-
lying probability weighting and (b) a fixed 
order of reasons for the priority heuristic.
concluSion
Decision researchers generally agree that 
elicitation methods have a strong influ-
ence on people’s choices. Undoubtedly, in 
decisions from description, models contain-
ing many free parameters or the editing of 
a choice problem can model task format 
effects – without changing the core process 
of weighting and summing. Both attempts 
seem unsatisfactory. I presented evidence 
showing that people use the priority heu-
ristic when problems are presented in a 
neutral text format, but that they search 
within gambles when gambles are placed 
in separate boxes. Salience, further, triggers 
fundamentally different choice processes in 
decisions from description. Together these 
results suggest that people use a multitude 
of decision strategies, and the priority heu-
ristic seems to be one key candidate from the 
adaptive toolbox of risky-choice-strategies.
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